Gwen Hope is a corn-blooded central Iowan prone to independent research and petting cats.
AI seems inescapable in 2025. Since 2023, easily-accessible LLMs like ChatGPT have soared as the common public concept of AI. The less public face are the AI tools that governments increasingly use to control and manage the populace. One of the most increasingly ubiquitous uses of these are AI mass surveillance systems.
Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) systems are preeminent examples of these tools. These systems are already along roadways across Iowa. In the United States, Flock Safety, a tech start-up founded in 2017 currently valued in the billions, develops, licenses, and leases the most common ALPR system software and hardware. Flock is an increasingly visible example, but they are one in a smattering of tech companies across the country cashing in by cashiering citizen privacy.
Flock’s system automatically records and processes still images and/or video through AI to create a unique “Vehicle Fingerprint™”. This “fingerprint” allows users to track a vehicle by license plate plus “type, make, color, state registration, missing/covered plates, bumper stickers, decals, roof racks, and bike racks” (source, pg. 5, 10). The company website boasts of more wide-ranging capabilities in addition.
Governments using ALPR systems are performing ongoing indiscriminate mass surveillance against anything vehicle-shaped (including bikes) on roadways, parking lots, and everywhere in-between. Private businesses and neighborhood associations can join these networks in support of this mass surveillance as well. This may concern you, this may not. However, these companies are developing far more intrusive systems that incorporate data panopticons and drones as part of a largely unchecked, unregulated tech boom. Let’s put the scale of surveillance into focus, shall we?
AI Surveillance Proliferates
(To view map, click “Load External Iframe”)
These distributed, interconnected systems are far-encompassing. Flock’s super-network tracks people across jurisdiction, or, in other words, across cities, counties, states, regions, and, yes, the country as a whole. Flock boasts their nationwide search sifts through “10 billion additional plate reads per month” in 2024 (source, pg. 5). If the 2022 estimates of roughly 280 million registered cars in the United States remain close to accurate, simple math shows Flock scanned the equivalent of 35 times every single registered car.
Civil Rights And Privacy Concerns
The jurisdictional limits of each state, county, and city only apply insomuch as Flock-contracted governments willingly abide and adhere to policies and limitations. This system appears to be an end-run around oversight and regulation. Essentially, Flock functions as a quasi-government organization performing governmental functions without similar constitutional and statutory restrictions which limit government. This distributed, largely unregulated, network of networks has privacy and civil rights advocates ringing alarm bells and for good reason, as these two recent examples illustrate:
From April 9 to May 9 of this year, as 404 Media and the Electronic Frontier Foundation reported, the Johnston County, Texas Sheriff’s Office leveraged Flock’s expanded search function to target a woman nationwide for allegedly taking medication to induce miscarriage (medication abortion). This search used 83,345 Flock ALPRs from 6,809 government networks, including those networks within states with abortion/reproductive healthcare shield laws such as Illinois whose Secretary of State is now investigating this apparent breach.
Despite Flock transparency portals (more on this later) explicitly stating “immigration enforcement” as a prohibited use of their ALPR systems, non-federal authorities have been using them as middlemen on behalf of the ICE and similar federal agencies, as reported by 404 Media.
Scope: Around The Metro
In 2023, Axios and The Des Moines Register covered the initial upswing of ALPR proliferation among the Des Moines metro. However the timeline of interest in these systems varies substantially by municipality; by 2024, Iowa communities hosted 450 Flock ALPR cameras, or one camera per a little more than 7,000 residents.
Across the metro, some local communities began signing contracts with Flock in 2020, (West Des Moines), 2021 (Altoona) and 2022 (Ankeny, Clive, Urbandale) while others have only recently began adopting ALPRs into our communities in the past couple years (Pleasant Hill, Johnston), and still other communities which have no ALPRs currently (Grimes, Windsor Heights).
The city of Johnston illustrates how Flock networks can transcend jurisdiction. The most recent city in the Des Moines metro to begin using Flock ALPRs, Johnston’s eleven cameras (soon to be sixteen this year) began operation in July 2024. The 2024 Yearly Flock Usage Report for Johnston reads:
Currently the Johnston Police Department has full access to the search results of 620 external networks consisting of access to over 8747 Cameras.
We have access to the search results of 450 cameras within the State of Iowa. The number of ALPR’s the Department has shared access to will continue to grow as agencies continue to add cameras to existing programs and as new agencies come on line with their programs.
To clarify, Johnston, a town of an estimated 25,000 people, was able to access 620 other networks, each network being a specific city, county, or state police force or agency. The report lists that only 450 cameras of the 8747 cameras Johnston Police had access to were within Iowa — that’s only 5.14 percent, leaving the other 94.86 percent cameras being non-Iowan.
Surveillance Record Struggles
Beginning in April, the author of this article submitted open records requests under Iowa Code Chapter 22, which allows the public to request and receive a large variety of public records. This author filed requests with Ankeny, Ames, Altoona, Clive, Des Moines, Grimes, Johnston, Pleasant Hill, Polk City, Urbandale, Waukee, West Des Moines, and Windsor Heights.
Certain cities were very forthcoming, such as Johnston and Urbandale, while others have been resistant to disclosure, such as Ankeny, Altoona, Waukee, and Pleasant Hill. The author cannot afford to fully evaluate Polk City, Waukee, and Des Moines as certain records require fees paid to obtain: ~$150, ~$200, ~$350 respectively.
(If you would like to help the author afford these disclosures, see here.)
Record Disclosures and the Retention Argument
Governments approve installation locations for these systems; ALPR contractors install and maintain these systems on public property or public right-of-way easements. Due to that fact, it is reasonable for a citizen to expect that these installations would be public record. Yet, local and state governments argue against public record disclosure. Whether cities possess or retain ALPR records is the legal contention — as such, the author refers to this as the “retention argument.”
Governments resisting ALPR record disclosure invoke the retention argument by passing the buck to their contractors. They argue the contractor produces, maintains, and retains most-to-all of the records regarding the AI surveillance network they create, maintain, and expand on behalf of the government. The retention argument is arguably afoul of the law, since Chapter 22 of the Iowa Code states in Section 2, Paragraph 2:
A government body shall not prevent the examination or copying of a public record by
contracting with a nongovernment body to perform any of its duties or functions.
ALPR contractor software processes, disseminates, and stores data on behalf of the government. As a result, ALPR web interfaces, which allow city employees to sift contractor-processed city data, are likely “data processing software” for the purposes of Iowa Code Ch 22, Section 3A, which provides:
Section 2, Paragraph a. A government body may provide, restrict, or prohibit access to data processing software developed by the government body or developed by a nongovernment body and used by a government body pursuant to a contractual relationship with the nongovernment body, regardless of whether the data processing software is separated or combined with a public record. A government body shall establish policies and procedures to provide access to public records which are combined with its data processing software. A public record shall not be withheld from the public because it is combined with data processing software.
Example: Retention Argument Used By Altoona
Capt. Tony Chambers, Administrative Commander of the Altoona Police Department, provides an example of the retention argument in excerpts from an April 24 email:
The ALPR vendor (Flock Safety) creates and retains the deployment plan, therefore the record is not retained by the city. The deployment plan is a working map that is created and maintained by Flock. City staff review and mutually agree on the “designated location” via a online web portal with a map.
The vendor (Flock Safety) retains the records for dates of installation.
When asked for clarification, a follow-up email read:
Since the record is not retained by the city in any medium, it does not meet the definition of ‘public record’ under Iowa Code (see below). Please note that we are contracted for an ALPR service with Flock and are not the custodian of records for equipment that is neither installed nor owned by us.
“‘Lawful custodian’ means the government body currently in physical possession of the public record. The custodian of a public record in the physical possession of persons outside a government body is the government body owning that record.” Iowa Code § 22.1(2).”
“‘Public records’ includes all records, documents, tape, or other information, stored or preserved in any medium, of or belonging to this state or any county, city, township, school corporation, political subdivision ….” Iowa Code § 22.1(3)(a).”
IPIB Appeals and Retention Court Battles
In 2023, Iowa resident Hendrik Christian Van Pelt formally requested the ALPR location map (“Deployment Plan”) from West Des Moines. In response, the city resisted disclosure with the retention argument. Not satisfied with their dismissal, Van Pelt appealed the denial with a formal complaint (23FC:0104) to the Iowa Public Information Board (IPIB), which takes citizen complaints regarding alleged violations of open records and open meetings laws by Iowa governments, government agencies, and those legally attached.
After the IPIB dismissed Van Pelt’s complaint on January 18, 2024 for being “legally insufficient,” Van Pelt filed suit against the Board in Iowa District Court a month later on February 29. On November 29, the Court ruled in favor of Van Pelt. The Court ruling reversed IPIB’s dismissal and ordered that the Board properly consider Van Pelt’s complaint:
The location of the devices used to record that information, which are known to and approved by the City, and identified in the Deployment Plan sought by Van Pelt, is used by its police department in performing its primary function – i.e. crime prevention and evidence gathering. Arguably, if the contract with Flock had solely been for the installation of the cameras and ended there, it could have been viewed as a limited agreement for goods and services. This Agreement, however, contemplates far more than that. It is for an extended duration, at significant cost, and outlines an ongoing business relationship in which Flock is responsible for facilitating law enforcement’s ability to enhance its purpose and function. As a result, the Deployment Plan becomes a public record subject to disclosure for purposes of Chapter 22. Likewise, the Reinstall Fee Schedule would also be subject to disclosure, although it appears that Van Pelt likely may already have access to that information, and if so, would not have standing in this action to address that portion of his request.
Following the ruling, Van Pelt charged the IPIB with not following the court’s order. After a couple months, the Court issued a stay for the ruling, as the Iowa Attorney General’s office began appealing the District Court’s ruling to the Iowa Supreme Court. At this writing, that appeal remains ongoing.
Given the substantial resistance a member of the public must go through to attempt to even get disclosure of a map or list of ALPRs installed by a government body, along with the urgency of noticing these devices popping up rapidly across the U.S., privacy advocates began coordinating to mark these cameras as they found them. This has culminated in the DeFlock project, a crowdsourced map created from data on OpenStreetMap, a free and open-source map alternative to closed source maps (e.g. Google Maps, Apple Maps, Bing Maps, etc.). DeFlock’s volunteer contributors, which include this article’s author, believe the public has a right to know where these mass surveillance cameras are located.
Significant Roadblocks To Transparency
In a stricter departure from the record retention argument, which has already experienced legal setbacks, other cities in the Des Moines metro argue something far different — confidential exemption. Pleasant Hill Police Chief Al Pizzano provides an example of this in his May 7 email reply:
1a [Requesting ALPR locations]—Pursuant to Iowa Code 21.7 [sic] this information is confidential.
1b [Requesting ALPR install methods]—See attached payments and invoicing records which reflect the general installation information but specific records indicating installation are not in the City’s possession.
1c [Requesting ALPR install dates]—See invoices and payment which reflect the general timing of installation but specific records showing dates of installation are not in the City’s possession.
1d [Requesting ALPR expenditures]—See attached records which is all that is in City’s possession.
1e [Requesting ALPR manufacturer]—Flock
1f [Requesting ALPR system model types]—Unless stated on attached records the City does not have in its possession records that provide this information. If it did these would be considered confidential records.
1g [Requesting ALPR contracts and invoices]—See attached payment records/invoices.
Here we can see here that Pleasant Hill argues a combination of the retention argument plus a confidentiality argument. Chapter 22, Section 7 (email has a typo) of the Iowa Code outlines records which are exempt from public disclosure — in total 75 paragraphs specify types of records. Chief Pizzano doesn’t specify a paragraph in his email, so the exemption cited is unknown.
Regardless, we see a significant shift in argument — the retention argument claims the city has no records in which to disclose, so it can’t disclose what it does not possess/retain; the confidentiality argument, however, claims the city is exempt from public disclosure under the law. Essentially, it shifts the argument from “We can’t” to “We won’t” in terms of public record disclosure.
Pizzano also combines both arguments in response to the request item for ALPR model type. Paraphrasing the combination argument Pizzano made, “We can’t, but if we could, we wouldn’t.” Ironically, the city provided invoices that listed the ALPR model (Flock Falcon®).
Reinforcing The Record Barricade
The replies by the cities of Polk City and Waukee to open records requests shows an escalation in the confidentiality arguments. Waukee’s May 14 reply from City Clerk Becky Schuett and Polk City’s May 23 reply from Police Chief Jeremy Siepker, despite being nine days apart, are nearly identical with only slight changes between the two, suggesting common origin.
Paragraph 1 (Polk City Version)
In reviewing your requests, the City does not possess records responsive to many or your requests. In addition, many of your requests, if the City possessed a record that may be responsive, are confidential under Iowa Code Section 22.7(50) which defines certain records as confidential, including:
- Information and records concerning physical infrastructure, cyber security, critical infrastructure, security procedures or emergency preparedness information developed, maintained, or held by a government body for the protection of life or property, if disclosure could reasonably be expected to jeopardize such life or property.
- a. Such information and records include but are not limited to information directly related to vulnerability assessments; information contained in records relating to security measures such as security and response plans, security codes and combinations, passwords, restricted area passes, keys, and security or response procedures; emergency response protocols; and information contained in records that if disclosed would significantly increase the vulnerability of critical physical systems or infrastructures of a government body to attack.
Starting off, Polk City here invokes the retention argument and makes a statement similar to Pleasant Hill (saying even if the city retained any documents, they wouldn’t disclose them). However, in comparison to Pleasant Hill, Waukee and Polk City cite Iowa Code 22.7(50), including a copy of the statute. Paragraph 50 specifically refers to information about systems which protect life and property with a condition to the exemption — “if disclosure could reasonably be expected to jeopardize such life or property.”
As such, the legal question is twofold: 1) What life or property does a Flock AI mass surveillance system protect? 2) What jeopardy occurs if the public is informed? Paragraph 50 does not, on its face, appear to apply to ALPR networks. If we consider Point A, this becomes more self-evident.
Paragraph 2 (Waukee Version)
The information requested in your request number 1(a)(d)(e), 3, 4 and 5 [ALPR Location, Manufacturer, Model/Type, Emails Between ALPR Companies and City Employees, Audit Log, and List of Other Cities Who Access City’s ALPR systems], if possessed by the City and disclosed, would allow the general public to determine how the system works, what the video range is and the quality of the system, it’s limitations, and processes for utilization leading to the distinct possibility that the system could be compromised or that its weaknesses be exploited. In addition, it would subject the infrastructure to potential vandalism and damage, or destruction. The Iowa Public Information Board has previously considered the application of Iowa Code 22.7(50) as it pertains to requests for similar information in 22FC:0065 (sic) (exterior library security camera footage), 22FC:0025 (security and response plans), 19FC:0129 (audit logs), 17FC:0071 (video surveillance footage), 17FC:0012 (building floor plans), 16FC:0031, (recorded telephone calls), and 15FC:0002 (courthouse surveillance cameras).
Once again invoking the retention argument plus the confidential argument, however it expounds on government anxieties about disclosure. This paragraph cites seven Formal Complaints (see table below) made by citizens to the Iowa Public Information Board. The author of the cities’ replies closely paraphrases the Board’s Probable Cause report from complaint 15FC:0002, which itself reads:
A release of the recordings, as a public record, even if jurors are not present, would allow the general public to determine how the security system works, what the video range is and the quality of the videotaping, leading to the distinct possibility that the security system could be compromised or that its weaknesses be exploited.
Of the complaints, four reference surveillance (three video, one audio) within protected legal spaces — a courthouse, a jail, a correctional facility and a public library; one references a building partially-used for university president residence; two reference digital records from public entities. Most of these appear to have no bearing on the matter at hand with AI surveillance systems.
Context is important. Most of the public likely understands that a courthouse, a jail, and a correctional facility are sensitive legal areas with heightened security needs. The public right-of-way is a foundational component of the public commons. Flock’s AI-powered surveillance networks monitor these common areas, not sensitive areas.
IPIB Complaint Decisions Cited
| IPIB Formal Complaint | Complainant Request | IPIB Reasoning |
| 15FC:0002 | Surveillance Footage Inside Courthouse Including Jury Selection Of Trial Associated With Complainant | Jury Selection Protections Iowa Code Section 22.7(50) Due To Courthouse Security |
| 16FC:0031 | Recording of Jail Phone Call | Iowa Code Section 22.7(50) Due To Jail Employee, Resident/Inmate, and Visitor Security |
| 17FC:0012 | Building Schematics For Iowa State University Building (University President Residence – Knoll) | Iowa Code Section 22.7(50) Due To Building Resident Security |
| 17FC:0071 | Surveillance Footage From Correctional Facility | Iowa Code Section 22.7(50) Due To Facility Employee, Resident, and Visitor Security |
| 19FC:0129 | Audio and Video Recordings From Madrid City Council Meeting, Audit Logs From City Servers | Iowa Code Section 22.7(50) Protects Some Audit Log Information, Which May Be Redacted At Cost |
| 22FC:0025 | Digital Records From Iowa State University Departments | Iowa Code Section 22.7(5) Due To Police Investigative Reports Iowa Code Section 22.7(50) Due To Plan For ISU Faculty/Staff Security |
| 22FC:0064 (the number 65 in the emails is incorrect, the explanatory text refers to complaint 64) | Security Camera Footage Inside Vinton Public Library | Iowa Code Section 22.7(13) Protects Certain Library Information Iowa Code Section 22.7(50) Protects Library Patrons (often minors) |
Paragraphs 3–4
With Regard to 1(b)(c)(f)[Date of Install, Cost to Buy/Rent ALPRs, Cost To Install ALPRs], The only responsive records possessed by the City are the contract(s) and invoices provided in response to request number 2.
With regard to request number 2, “Any and all previous or current contracts, service agreements, invoices, order forms, contract/service amendment forms, subscriptions, or leases of ALPR systems, including, but not limited to, physical hardware, software expenditures, service costs, and maintenance”, we are providing the contract(s) and invoices received by the City for the ALPR system. We are also providing the council resolution(s) approving the contracts.
Both cities provided records for Paragraphs 3 and 4. They are replying to lines in the open records request email soliciting financial information regarding the city’s fiscal relationship to AI surveillance system contractors.
Paragraph 5
While the information requested in request number 5 [List of other civil entities which have access to the city’s ALPR data] would be confidential, the City does not have a list responsive to the request.
Paragraph 5 is another instance of resistance. The request item resisted is a list of any civil entities which access the city in question’s ALPR network data. Iowa Code Ch 22, Section 7 appears to list no exemptions that could shield any and all lists of external government bodies and agencies granted access to a city’s surveillance network. It is unclear what confidentiality the replies refer to regarding this.
The public can request audit logs, as Section 7 doesn’t shield them outright. However, government record holders can redact confidential information contained within audit logs and charge the requester the time spent doing so, per IPIB Formal Complaint 19FC:0129.
Transparency(?) Portals
Whether or not this information is provided is spotty. Flock, for instance, provides the ability baked into its service software to provide a “transparency portal.” This service provides a web page which incorporates basic information and dynamic statistics on the contractee’s ALPR network. In truth, however, government bodies choose to enable or disable the portal; they choose to include or exclude data from it as well.
Let’s compare/contrast portals, Johnston vs the University of Iowa Police Department. Johnston’s portal lists no external organization or audit log. The university police department’s portal lists external organizations who have access to their Flock data — a sizeable 1,066 organizations, of which only 84 (7.8 percent) are in Iowa. Additionally, the University of Iowa Police Department’s portal provides a link to a public audit log so the public can ostensibly evaluate law enforcement usage of the system.
All article images were photographed by the author and are under a CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 license. The magnifying glass graphic for the featured/topmost image was derived from a public domain asset by Dan Pelleg and heavily customized. All other graphic modifications or edits created/performed by the author.
The author considers generative AI to be wholly unethical. No AI/LLM tools were used in the creation of this article. However, less sophisticated machine learning tools (e.g. spellcheck) were used.